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ABSTRACT 
The purposes of this study were two-fold; to develop a cycling-specific cognitive 
strategy classification system, and to investigate the differential and interactive effects 
of effort and competitive status, on associative strategy use in cyclists. 
Subjects consisted of 8 elite, 8 average, and 8 recreational cyclists (n = 24). A light-
weight micro-cassette recorder was used to document the subjects' verbalized 
thoughts while training. Effort was measured by the rating of percieved exertion (RPE), 
and through the recording of heart rate every 60 seconds. 
A cycling-specific subcategory of thought (equipment monitoring) was identified, which 
had not previously been identified in similar research on marathon runners. The 
implications of sport specific classification systems are discussed. Statistical analyses 
showed no support for the popular notion that cognitive strategy use varies according 
to competitive status. Neither did they show support for the notion that it varies 
according to effort. The statistically non-significant findings are discussed in the light 
of the stochastic nature of cycling, and recommendations are made to cater for this 
in future research. 
CHAPTER 1: 
COGNITIVE COPING STRATEGIES IN 
ENDURANCE SPORT: A LITERATURE REVIEW 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
1 
The sport psychology literature abounds with terms describing the collective 
psychological techniques used to enhance athletic performance. Terms such as 
11intervention strategies11 (Whelan, Mahoney & Meyers, 1991), 11Cognitive strategiesn 
(Morgan, 1985), and 11Cognitive skills11 (Okwumabua, 1985), are often used 
interchangeably, and to denote the same techniques. The most widely used of these 
techniques include visualization and mental rehearsal, anxiety/arousal management, 
and self instruction and self monitoring. While the term 11cognitive coping strategies11 , 
as it appears in the title encompasses all of these techniques, the majority will only be 
mentioned in passing. The focus of this review will lie specifically with thought 
processes occuring during endurance events, and the term cognitive strategies will in 
the present review be used solely to refer to this category of techniques. 
Just about all athletes would acknowledge having various thoughts during endurance 
events. It is ludicrous to imagine someone running a marathon without ever thinking 
something along the way. It is only when an athlete deliberately adopts a particular 
thought process to facilitate performance however, that his thoughts may be termed 
a 11Strategy11 • The last two decades have seen an increasing amount of research done 
in this area of sport psychology. This review will attempt to trace the development of 
this line of research, with particular emphasis on Morgan's distinction between 
associative and dissociative thought processes (Morgan, 1977). As different 
researchers have investigated these processes in different ways, the review will not 
look at research developments in a chronological fashion. Rather it will attempt to draw 
together all of the past research by focusing on the main methodological issues and 
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the resultant findings. It is hoped that this will help clarify the present state of our 
knowledge in this field, its implications for practical application, as well as possible 
future directions for research. 
1.2 HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE RESEARCH 
Though still in its infancy, sport psychology has over the past three decades 
increasingly established itself as a separate discipline in its own right. This reflects the 
growing awareness of psychological factors, along with natural ability and learning 
experiences, being one of the three major determinants of optimum performance in 
sport. Rushall (1989) has proposed that sport psychology is the key to sporting 
excellence, and described it as 'the sport science that governs the quality of a 
performance11 (p165). This is in keeping with Ryder, Carr & Herget's (1976) 
suggestions that running records are still way below human physiological limits, and 
that restraints on performance are psychological. 
With respect specifically to endurance events, Morgan (1977) points out that one might 
intuitively expect performance to depend not only on physical ability, but also on the 
willingness to tolerate any discomfort associated with the hard work. With the rapidly 
increasing professionalization of sport, and the concommitent emphasis on 
performance and winning, it is not surprising then that researchers began to study the 
psychology of endurance events. While this type of athletic activity includes swimming, 
cycling and canoeing events, the overwhelming majority of research was done on 
distance runners. This was probably due to the phenomenal growth of the sport 
amongst the average (perhaps previously inactive) members of the community. 
The early research in this field consisted largely of descriptive studies aimed at 
identifying various groups of athletes. It was hoped that this might provide clues as to 
what inspired the jogging phenomenon amongst such a diverse population. With 
respect to more elite athletes, it was felt that it would assist in selection, counselling 
and training. Comparing individual psychological traits and profiles to the 11ideal11 , could 
facilitate predictions of performance (Freischlag, 1981), 11psyching up11 (Morgan, 197 4), 
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and clini,cal interventions, eg. in the case of staleness (Puffer & McShane, 1992), or as 
.. emotional first aid .. after competition (Morgan, 1974). Underlying this search for the 
ideal .. marathon personality .. was the assu~ption that cognition and affect were major 
determinants of athletic performance. Today this view has been taken a step further 
with the hypothesis that personality characteristics such as affect, cognition and 
perception could potentially alter the cost (in terms of oxygen consumption) of physical 
exercise (Crews, 1992; Williams, Krahenbuhl & Morgan, 1991). 
The descriptive studies concerning the characteristics of the marathoner largely made 
use of various personality inventories such as the Cattell 16 PF Inventory and the 
Eysenck Personality Inventory (Cratty, 1973). Using a number of such psychological 
tests, Morgan & Costill (1972) found marathoners to score within the normal limits of 
extraversion-introversion, neuroticism-stability, and depression. However they scored 
significantly below the norm for anxiety. Clitsome and Kostrubala (1977) failed to 
identify a specific .. marathon personality .. , but did find a tendency for them to be more 
introverted than the general population. There seems to be some dispute about the 
latter claim however, with certain studies (eg. Gontang, Clitsome & Kostrubala, 1977) 
supporting it, and others (e.g. Morgan & Pollock, 1977), disputing it. 
The difficulty with distinguishing the marathoner from the general population in terms 
of psychological as well as psycho-social/demographic characteristics, in all likelihood 
stemmed from the vast diversity within the marathon population itself. Greater progress 
was however made in distinguishing elite marathoners from their non-elite counterparts. 
Morgan (1985) proposed a .. mental health model .. of human performance, which 
stipulated success in sport to be inversely correlated with psycho-pathology. 
This theory gained more corroborative support with a gradual change of focus from 
psychological traits to more transitory psychological states. Studies using the Profile 
of Mood States Questionnaire (McNair, Lorr & Doppleman, 1971) have consistently 
found elite athletes to have an "iceberg profile", scoring above the population mean on 
vigour, and below the mean on tension, depression, anger, fatigue and confusion 
(Morgan, O'Connor, Ellickson & Bradley, 1988). The fact that differences in state more 
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than trait were found between elite and non-elite athletes, lead Morgan & Pollock 
, 
(1977) to conclude that these differences represented a consequence of running rather 
than an antecedent condition. The idea that running might alter mood states is 
associated with, and probably contributed extensively to, the research concerning 
people's reasons for running and the benefits thereof. 
The physiological and psychological benefits of regular exercise have been well 
documented (e.g. Berger & Owen, 1987; Ewing & Scott, 1984). It is now generally 
accepted that running is related to decreased levels of anxiety and depression, thus 
resulting in enhanced psychological well-being. Some have even proposed running to 
be a therapeutic medium for treating depression (Greenspan, Fitzsimmons & Biddle, 
1991; Bartmann, 1991; Kostrubala, 1977). People who run are clearly aware of these 
benefits, as studies of various runners have consistently found perceived psychological 
benefits to be second only to physiological benefits as reasons given for their 
behaviour (Clough, Shepherd & Maughan, 1989; Summers, Sargent, Levey & Murray, 
1982; Harris, 1981; Carmack & Martens, 1979). 
Anecdotal evidence has in fact long claimed that many runners experience a 11highn 
whilst running. This transcendental experience is characterized by feelings of euphoria 
and analgesia during the run, and followed by feelings of relaxation or quiescence 
thereafter. Various authors have postulated that running time and distance are major 
determinants of the onset of such experiences (Carmack & Martens, 1979; Kostrubala, 
1977). Glasser (1976) was the first person to propose that the runner may become 
addicted to these pleasurable feelings. He suggested that the pain, misery and upset 
associated with a missed run, represented withdrawal symptoms resulting from the 
lack of euphoric and intensely pleasurable feelings usually gained from running. He 
described this as a positive addiction in so far as it did not come to 11dominate11 the 
person's life. 
The weakness of Glasser's work was the lack of strong experimental control. More 
recently however, the findings from a number of other studies have supported 
Glasser's notion of addiction to running (Clough et al., 1989; Perkins, 1988; Summers 
5 
et al., 1 ~82; Carmack & Martens, 1979). Another controlled study by Morris et al. also 
supported the view that exercise increases endorphin activity, producing an addiction 
and resulting in a withdrawal syndrome if stopped (Morris, Steinberg, Sykes & Salmon, 
1990). However Crossman et al., in an exploratory study on the response of 
competitive athletes to a layoff from training, found no evidence for unpleasant effects 
of withdrawal from exercise. They also proposed however that two opposing 
processes may determine responses to layoff; negative effects of withdrawal from 
exercise, and positive effects related to dissipation of fatigue from overtraining 
(Crossman, Jamieson & Henderson, 1987). Presumably the second factor would play 
a greater role in the case of competitive athletes than in that of their non-competitive 
counterparts. 
Pargman proposed that all runners may be located on a continuum according to the 
nature or strength of their motivation for running, the two ends of which being 
designated addiction/ dependence, and commitment/dedication (1980). Runners who 
fall into the former category are characterized by a reliance on regular running, to the 
extent that a withdrawal syndrome is suffered after a layoff in training. In contrast to 
this, those in the latter category run for more intellectual or rational reasons, which may 
at best be described as pragmatic, e.g. for health reasons based on their doctors' 
recommendations. Pargman's continuum serves to illustrate that not everyone exhibits 
the same responses to running, or to the discontinuation thereof. In spite of the 
evidence suggesting that many runners do experience a high, Schomer (1987) for 
instance, found that the clear majority of his 31 subjects fell into the 
committed-dedicated runner class, and showed no evidence for experiencing any sort 
of "high". Hinton & Taylor (1986) have in fact hypothesized that the increasing (often 
anecdotal) awareness of a "runner's · high" has established the appropriate 
expectancies for this phenomenon to occur via a placebo response mechanism. The 
assertion that "runner's high" may be based on the psychophysiological mechanism 
characteristic of certain types of placebo responsivity certainly warrants further 
investigation. 
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A final ~rea of research concerning running and mood state, is that of the possible 
negative effects which the former may have on the latter. Such research usually 
appears in the literature of overtraining or staleness. Besides various physiological 
indices, these syndromes are usually characterized by feelings of restlessness, 
insomnia, undue fatigue, and loss of enerQY (Sperryn, 1984). Psychological self-report 
variables of mood and affect have in fact proved to be better descriptors and 
measures of overtrained states than physiological indices (Rushall, 1989). As these 
psychological changes occur prior to the onset of physical symptoms, they may also 
be used as warning signals to introduce a taper in training load, so as to prevent the 
onset of physiological breakdown. 
We have noted the gradual change in focus from personality traits to more temporary 
psychological states in the sport psychology literature. This research has aided our 
understanding of the psychological benefits of running, and has gone a long way 
toward increasing our understanding of the running phenomenon. Another, and 
perhaps more recent development, has been the shift in research focus from a 
theoretical understanding to that of a more applied knowledge. It has concentrated on 
the development and adaptation of various techniques which are practically useful in 
enhancing performance. Most of these techniques were originally borrowed from 
clinical psychology, and have since been specifically adapted for use in the sport 
setting. The most common of these include hypnosis (e.g. Morgan, 1970), relaxation 
and stress management (e.g. Ziegler, Klinzing & Williamson, 1982), biofeedback (e.g. 
Goldstein, Ross & Brady, 1977) and visualization and mental rehearsal (e.g. 
Ungerleider, Golding, Porter & Foster, 1989). 
Another related area of research has been the study of athletes' thought processes 
during endurance events. The possibility of shaping these thought processes in such 
a way as to optimize performance, makes this potentially a very useful area of applied 
research. Having sketched a brief history of the development of this, and related types 
of sport psychological research, the remainder of this review will now focus on 
cognitive coping strategies in endurance sport. In doing so it will use Morgan & 
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Pollock's (1977) association/dissociation distinction as a basic framework, as most 
individual studies since then have done the same. 
1.3 ASSOCIATION/DISSOCIATION 
Morgan used the term 11dissociation 11 to refer to the process whereby runners dealt with 
their pain and fatigue by diverting their thoughts away from these negative bodily 
sensations . 
.. Association .. on the other hand referred to the process of specifically concentrating 
on these and any other physical sensations by means of constant self-monitoring. He 
was not however the first to propose that associative thought processes may aid 
running performance. Two years previously, Fred Rowe, himself a runner, described 
running as a form of meditation: 
Running in harmony with the breathing rhythm, running relaxedly, and running with 
complete awareness of what one is doing ... gives the runner economy of energy 
leading to purity of movement. (In McCloy Layman, 1980, p270). 
While he only discovered these possible beneficial effects of associative thinking in 
1977, Morgan had already been aware of the dissociative process and its positive uses 
for quite a while. In fact he assumed that early Tibetan monks used a similar method 
in making possible their extraordinary runs. He points out that some of their alleged 
running feats compare rather favourably with today's best marathoners running under 
the most ideal conditions with all the current scientific support available to them. 
Morgan noted that the 11Cognitive strategy .. used by these monks remarkably resembled 
that used by marathon runners he had previously studied. Both groups used 
dissociative techniques to divert attention from painful bodily stimuli. While the 
marathoners mentally 11built houses .. , .. wrote letters .. , or with every step '1rod on the 
imaginary faces of detested co-workers .. , the monks allegedly repeated sacred phrases 
or mantras while fixing their eyes on distant objects. 
This originally led Morgan & Pollock to hypothesizing that the principal 11Cognitive 
strategy .. used by world class runners during competition, was dissociation of sensory 
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input (~organ & Pollock, 1977). To their surprise however, they found that while 
average marathoners did employ such strategies, elite runners in contrast associated, 
and attempted to process sensory feedback so as to modulate their pace accordingly. 
They concluded that elite marathoners' exceptional anatomical and physical capacities 
facilitated their use of associative cognitve strategies, which in turn allowed them to 
efficiently match physical performance to competitive demands. 
Since then, a number of researchers have investigated the potential advantages of 
both dissociative and associative cognitive strategies. Some have found dissociation 
to be the more useful of the two in enhancing performance (e.g. Okwumabua, Meyers, 
Schleser & Cooke, 1983; Pennebaker & Lightner, 1980), while others have found 
association to be the preferred strategy. This has especially been the case with 
researchers who have emphasized the importance of injury prevention. As injury is the 
major limiting factor in many athletes' performances (Sperryn, 1984), it is not surprising 
that aetiological factors of injuries have become a topical area of research (e.g. 
Macera, 1992). 
There is an underlying assumption that the ignoring of sensory cues occuring during 
dissociation will result in a higher risk of injury (Morgan & Pollock, 1977). Despite the 
obvious physical limitations of being injured, it has also been proposed that injuries 
may in some cases lead to the unwanted development of mental barriers (Madden, 
Kirkby & McDonald, 1989). On the other hand, prevention of injury through the use of 
association may result in the long term improvement of aerobic conditioning, and 
ultimately of race times (Schomer, 1987). Association may also improve performance 
by ensuring more economical movement (Schomer, 1990). Anderson points out that 
this is quite feasible as association 11keeps muscles loose, and relaxed muscles use 
less oxygen and can contract more powerfully than overly tight ones11 (Anderson, 1992, 
p7). 
It seems then that a substantial amount of support has been offered pointing to the 
benefits of both strategies. Different studies have however inevitably been 
characterized by different methodological variables. It is this author's hope that an 
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analysis of these methodological differences and their respective findings, will allow the 
' 
drawing of a synopsis regarding our curr_ent state of knowledge· in this field, so that 
ultimately we may have a clearer idea as to which strategies work best under particular 
conditions. 
1.4 METHODOLOGICAL VARIABLES IN PAST RESEARCH 
1.4.1 SUBJECT GROUPINGS 
It has already been mentioned that researchers have in the past attempted to isolate 
particular variables distinguishing athletes from non-athletes. Similar attempts have also 
been made to distinguish the elite in the former category from their non-elite 
counterparts. Obviously the types of differences studied has depended on the scientific 
context, e.g. physiological differences in a sports medicine context etc. In this particular 
context, we look at differences in cognitive strategy use as a function of the runners' 
competitive status (i.e. elite, non-elite, etc). 
With regard to competitive status, research looking at the thought processes occuring 
during endurance events has largely used one of three types of subject groupings. 
They are firstly, the sole use of elite athletes (e.g. Silva & Appelbaum, 1989; Morgan 
et al., 1988), secondly the sole use of non-elite athletes, (e.g. Okwumabua, 1985; 
Summers et al., 1982), and thirdly comparisons between elite and non-elite athletes 
(e.g. Schomer, 1990 & 1987). On the whole, these studies lend support to Morgan & 
Pollock's (1977) original assertion that elite runners tend to associate while non-elites 
tend to dissociate. Morgan (1978) later proposed that the elites' tendencies to 
associate may have been part of the reason for their good performances, and this 
notion appears to a certain extent to have become accepted by the sport 
psychological fraternity in general (e.g. Orlick, 1980). 
This does not however imply that non-elite athletes do any worse for using dissociative 
strategies. On the contrary, some research suggests that the use of dissociation 
actually enhances performance amongst the non-elite (Pennebaker & Lightner, 1980; 
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Weinber,g, Smith, Jackson & Gould, 1984). Morgan (1978) hypothesized that 
association works for elite runners as their superior physiological capacities result in 
them experiencing less pain, hence making it easier for them to concentrate on bodily 
cues. Non-elite runners on the other hand experience significantly more pain which if 
they do not dissociate from, would make their task that much more difficult. Anderson 
(1992) however argues that this does not seem a likely scenario as both elite and 
non-elite runners complete marathons at ~bout 80-85% of maximal aerobic capacity. 
The implication is that the two groups both run at similar perceived intensities, thus 
effectively nullifying the argument that elites can "afford" to associate more than 
non-elite runners. 
Another possible explanation for the differential effectiveness of cognitive strategies 
across different status of runners, is that elite runners simply practice association more 
as a result of training hard more often than non-elite runners, and hence are able to 
use it more effectively in competition. This raises the possibility that it is largely the 
experience or "practice effect" which mediates the (un)successfulness of particular 
cognitive strategy use. This possibility will be dealt with in greater detail, below. 
While a substantial amount of the research suggests that elite athletes associate more 
than non-elites, (the assumption being that competitive status is the major determinant 
of associative strategy use), not all research has supported this notion. Schomer (1987 
& 1986) found no support for the idea that elite runners predominantly use association 
while non-elite runners prefer dissociation. Instead, he found qualitative differences 
within associative thinking as practised by the two groups of runners. Elite runners 
tended to be more specific in their body monitoring, and exhibited more preciseness 
and control in terms of adapting their pace to the perceived requirements. Percentage 
of associative strategy use did not however vary significantly as a function of 
competitive status. 
It seems then that one cannot assume that all elite runners associate and non-elite 
runners dissociate, as was previously thought. No group of runners relies solely on 
one particular strategy, and the effectiveness of any particular strategy seems to be 
I 
mediated by a factor(s) beyond just competitive status. 
1.4.2 THOUGHT CLASSIFICATION 
The classification of cognitions is vital if they are to be shaped in such a way as to 
enhance performance. The classification system in effect needs to be structured in 
such a way as to allow its use as a theoretical framework upon which practical 
applications of the knowledge may be · based. Morgan & Pollock's association/ 
dissociation distinction fulfils such a need. Since they originally postulated it, a number 
of authors have used this system in their studies of cognition (Wrisberg & Pein, 1990; 
Silva & Appelbaum, 1989; Fillingham & Fine, 1986; Summers et al., 1982). Others have 
based actual intervention programmes on the system (Saintsing, Richman & Bergey, 
1988; Okwumabua et al., 1983). 
Not all authors have however stuck rigidly to Morgan & Pollock's two categories. Sacks 
et al proposed a third category- 11meditative thinking 11 , which differs from association 
and dissociation in that the runners are not focusing either on themselves or on 
specific distracting thoughts, but are instead 11not particularly focusing at all 11 (Sacks, 
Milvy, Perry & Sherman, 1981). Raila & Unestahl {1979) also speak of 11meditative 
running 11 , although in so far as their process requires a 11passive concentration on 
something 11 , be it a mantra or particular body movement, it may still be described as 
dissociating behaviour. 
Weinberg {1985), spoke of 11positive self-talk11 as a category distinct from association 
and dissociation. However Kirschenbaum & Wittrock {1984), in their vision of athletic 
skill development as a self-regulatory process, understood self-instruction and 
self-monitoring to be complementary functions. This appears to be a valid assumption, 
as using one of these mechanisms in isolation from the other would not be very fruitful 
in terms of effecting adaptive changes. Thus the runner who through self-monitoring 
becomes aware of a tightening of his calf muscles but does not (instruct himself to) 
do anything about it, may just as well not be aware of the problem in the first place. 
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Schomer (1987) was aware of the complementary nature of self- monitoring and 
positive self-talk, when he proposed the latter (under the term .. command and 
instruction .. ), to be one of ten sub-categories of runners' thoughts. Schomer identified 
these ten exhaustive, mutually-exclusive . and independent theme categories after 
content analysing recorded verbalizations of runners' cognitions. Using Morgan & 
Pollock's original association/ dissociation distinction as a framework, he identified four 
subcategories as being associative in nature (viz. feelings and affects; body 
monitoring; command and instruction; pace monitoring). The remaining six were 
dissociative in nature (environmental feedback; reflective activity thoughts; personal 
problem solving; work, career and management; course information; talk and 
conversational chatter). 
Schomer then .amalgamated his subcategories with Nideffer's (1981) attentional style 
categorization, which classifies attention according to direction (internal/external) and 
width (narrow/ broad). This gave him ten valid and reliable cognitive strategy 
sub-classifications (see Figure 1, p32) which were seen to offer 11further instructional 
insights and mechanisms for future opttmal manipulations of cognitive strategies .. 
(Schomer, 1987, p42). 
While other researchers investigating association/dissociation patterns have since 
made use of Nideffer's work, (e.g. Wrisberg & Pein, 1990), it may be worthwhile noting 
that other authors have also proposed other classifications of attentional style. Three 
of Cratty's (1984) five attentional dimensions, naniely quality, flexibility and duration of 
attention are not catered for in Nideffer's scheme. It is quite possible that they may 
offer further insight into the practical application of cognitive strategies, especially in 
the light of evidence alluding to the flexible nature of actual cognitive strategy use by 
athletes (See later). 
1.4.3 METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION 
The vast majority of researchers investigating cognitive processes during endurance 
events have used retrospective methods of data collection. These have taken the form 
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either of interviews or the administration of questionnaires at some point in time after 
' . 
the completion of the endurance event(s) (Wrisberg & Pein, 1990; Silva & Appelbaum, 
1989; Ungerleider et al., 1989; Saintsing et al., 1988; Morgan et al., 1988; Spink, 1988; 
Fillingham & Fine, 1986; Okwumabua, 1985; Weinberg, 1985; Weinberg et al.,1984; 
Okwumabua et al., 1983; Summers et al., 1982; Freischlag, 1981; Carmack & Martens, 
1979; Morgan & Pollock, 1977; Lumian, 1974). 
Sacks et al. (1981) have pointed out that such retrospective methods may represent 
a source of error in the aforementioned studies. Subjects may forget or distort some 
of their previous thoughts, perhaps as a result of certain types of thoughts carrying 
more emotional investment than others. In an attempt to counter this methodological 
weakness they •'tested .. their subjects every three hours during a 1 00-mile running 
event. 
While the method used by Sacks et al. represents a strengthening of research design, 
the information was still gleaned in response to specific cues - subjects responded to 
specific pre-selected questions, every three hours. There is always the chance that 
some information may have been forgotten even within the three hour period, and 
there is no guarantee that the questions posed will prompt the offering of all thought 
processes spanning the previous three hours. 
Schomer's (1987) innovative method of data collection went a long way toward solving 
these difficulties. Using light-weight microcassette recorders, he collected continuous 
on-the-spot verbalizations of runners' thought processes during training runs. In 
support of this method, Schomer offers Ericsson & Simon's assertion that •'the most 
important condition under which verbalization can be expected to be an accurate 
account of cognitive activity, is that the verbal report has to be made concurrently with 
the task-related cognitive activity .. (In Schomer, 1987, p61). While this method may not 
necessarily present an exact version of thought processes, it is certainly an 
improvement on the administration of retrospective interviews and questionnaires. 
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M.Biackburn (Personal communication, 8 March 1993) compared three different 
techniques of thought documentation during treadmill running: Thought verbalization 
and post-exercise interview; questions presented on slides during run and post-
exercise questionnaire; video-taping of run and post-exercise narrative of thoughts. The 
results did not shed doubt on the accuracy of verbal reports taken during exercise. He 
did however express some concern that continuous verbalization . in an endurance 
activity would cause some interference, if only with respiration. Blackburn concluded 
that better thought recording during treadmill running was achieved through a 
combination of thought verbalizations triggered by random signals, and video-taping 
of the subject during the run (where subjects were asked to elaborate on their 
thoughts while watching the videos post-exercise). 
While Blackburn's methodology represents a further improvement, especially by 
providing more information in the form of the video recording, this must be balanced 
against the potential quality of information lost as a result of the laboratory setting. 
1.4.4 SITUATIONAL VARIABLES 
i. Different sports: Thus far in our review of cognitive strategies in endurance 
sport, we have dealt exclusively with distance running. The simple reason for this is 
that there seems to be very little similar research done in other endurance sports. 
While several researchers have identified conitive style differences between elite and 
non-elite athletes in other sports (Okwumabua et al., 1983), these do not represent 
cognitive strategies per se, and as the sports are not really endurance events, the 
association/dissociation distinction is probably not as applicable anyway. 
Bakker et al. (1993) looked at association/dissociation patterns in triathletes and found 
some support for Morgan & Pollock's original assertion that elite marathoners 
associate more than non-elites. Spink & Longhurst looked at the effects of cognitive 
strategy use on the performances of advanced swimmers, but found most of the 
improvements due to analgesic suggestions (In Spink, 1988). Chorkawy and Ford both 
found up to 15% improvements in maximum performance of nationally ranked 
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swimmers. after using numerous psychological techniques, one of which was 
associative thinking (In Saintsi.ng et al., 1988). Clingman & Hilliard (1990) studied race 
walkers and found that differences between particular internal focii were more 
important than the association/dissociation distinction per se. 
A final variation on the running theme has occured in laboratory settings, where a 
number of studies have shown dissociative strategies to improve performance on 
.. artificial .. leg-lift tasks (Spink, 1988; Weinberg, 1985; Weinberg et al., 1984). Gill & 
Strom (1985) similarly found that athletes performed more repetitions on a quadriceps 
machine when ~eing externally focused. To what extent such tasks are comparable in 
terms of endurance to running a marathon, is however unsure. Laboratory tasks such 
as those cited above are typically not nearly as long temporally as are applied tasks 
such as running a marathon. Clearly however, there is much scope for similar research 
in the applied settings of endurance swimming, cycling, canoeing and triathlon events. 
ii. Distance: As may already have become obvious in the previous section, there 
is some confusion as to what exactly represents an endurance event. It has already 
been noted that changes in state of mind may occur as a function of the time/distance 
spent running. These are however changes in affect, and they do not necessarily imply 
corresponding changes in cognitive strategy. 
Past researchers have used a wide range of distances under the banner of endurance 
events. Okwumabua et al. (1983) and Sacks et al. (1981) investigated the use of 
cognitive strategies over the distances of 1 ,5 miles and 100 miles respectively. The 
former study found the use of dissociation to be positively correlated to improvements 
in performance. However to what extent this may be attributed to the relatively short 
distance or to the novice status of the subjects, is unclear. It is important that this 
confusion is cleared up if we are to ascertain exactly under what conditions particular 
cognitive strategies are most useful. 
iii. Status of the endurance event: This refers to the competitive or training 11nature11 
of the event being undertaken by the subjects. Summers et al. (1982) made a direct 
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comparison between cognitive strategy use in the two settings. They found that 69% . . 
of average runners usually dissociated during training, but that this figure dropped to 
only 6% during a race. The rest of the time was spent in associative thinking (30,7%), 
and other thought patterns which Summers et al. failed to identify as distinctly 
associative or dissociative in nature (63,3%). 
These findings are supported by a more recent study which also points to a 
predominance of dissociative thinking during training, and associative thinking during 
racing (Masters & Lambert, 1989). A similar pattern of selective cognitive strategy use 
seems to apply to elite runners (Morgan et al., 1988). 
iv. Acquisition of cognitive strategy skills: It seems that many runners develop and 
use association/dissociation skills of their own accord. Studies of runners taking part 
in a number of marathons have supported this notion (Silva & Applelbaum, 1989; 
Okwumabua, 1985; Summers et al., 1982). While these studies simply used 
retrospective techniques to ascertain 11naturally-occuring 11 cognitive strategy use, others 
have actually attempted to control use thrpugh the ~teaching .. of particular strategies. 
It is possible that the method of teaching used in each of such cases may have 
affected their respective results. 
Spink (1988) and Weinberg (1985) both gave instructions to subjects after randomly 
assigning them to either association, dissociation or control conditions. Saintsing et al. 
(1988) used a similar technique, although their subjects were additionally .. periodically 
reminded during the semester ... to think about their specific instructions ... {p35). In all 
cases the content of these .. instructional packages .. were basically just instructions to 
focus on sensory feedback in the case of the association conditions, and to think of 
anything but that in the dissociating conditions. 
Are such 1teaching .. techniques sufficient to ensure the proper implementation of, and 
the deriving of maximum benefit from the cognitive strategies? This seems highly 
unlikely as Okwumabua et al. (1983) instructed their subjects in cognitive strategy use 
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over a 5-week period, and found that the techniques used by all subjects, irrespective 
' 
of which strategy they had originally been told to use, became increasingly associative. 
Schomer's (1990) study featured an innovative method of training subjects in cognitive 
strategy use. He actively shaped their thought processes over a 5-week intervention 
period by using light-weight two-way radios during training runs. This created a 
11prqctice effecf' which various authors have deemed necessary for the successful 
implementation of cognitive strategies (Spink, 1988; Rothstein, 1979). This is in line with 
proposals by other researchers that simulation of competitive conditions in training is 
important to ensure effective use in competition (Orlick, 1980; Raila & Unestahl, 1979). 
Singer (1988) recognized the importance of the nature of the teaching method used. 
He asserted that the chosen method should encourage the learning of, as well as 
support the use of the newly acquired skills. He advocated the demise of 11dictatorial11 
teaching styles to ensure the possibility of cross-situational applications of the 
techniques. In short, different athletes require different techniques under different 
circumstances, and hence the ultimate goal of teaching should be 11tO provide 
individuals with the ability to diagnose situations, task demands and personal status 
on their own, and to self-generate appropriate strategies that would contribute to their 
own performance effectiveness .. (p51 ). 
1.4.5 COGNITIVE STRATEGIES AND INDIVIDUAL.ATHLETE VARIABLES 
This section will examine the variables within individual athletes, which are examined 
most often in the literature on cognitive strategy use in endurance events. 
i. Performance: Two studies have correlated associative/ dissociative thought 
patterns with performance in a 11natural 11 race setting. Silva & Appelbaum (1989) found 
cognitive strategy use to be related to performance in the US Olympic marathon trials. 
Their results suggested that the top finishers employed both associative and 
dissociative techniques, while lower finishers indicated the early adoption and 
maintenance of a dissociative strategy. 
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Okwumabua {1985) however found no relationship between cognitive strategy use and 
finishing time in a similar study with non-elite runners. A possible reason for this is that 
one would expect quite a vast difference in ability amongst a random group of 
non-elite runners. A similar group of elite runners is however less likely to feature as 
vast a difference in physical ability, and hence we might expect psychological factors 
such as cognitive strategies to play a larger role in determining finishing position. 
ii. Experience: From the section on differences between elite and non-elite athletes, 
we may already have had an inkling that past running experience may prove to be an 
important moderator {if not the most) of cognitive strategy use. Crews {1992) contends 
that in general, experienced runners benefit from associative strategies, while lesser 
experienced runners benefit more from the use of dissociative strategies. (Note that 
experience does not necessarily imply elite status). A number of researchers have 
supported this notion (Weinberg et al., 1984; Okwumabua et al., 1983; Nideffer, 1979). 
Madden et al. (1989) found age to be a moderate predictor of strategy use. In so far 
as age could be taken to be a fairly good predictor of past running experience, this 
might also be taken as support for Crews' contention. Adding weight to this notion is 
the fact that the use of associative strategies is related to the prevention of running 
injuries, and research has found increasing age to be inversely proportional to the rate 
of running injuries (Macera, 1992). 
Evidence against the hypothesized relationship between association and running 
experience was offered by Wrisberg & Pein {1990), who found that experienced 
runners dissociate more often than novice runners. It is not clear how they defined 
11experienced1 however, and as all their subjects were university students, it is unlikely 
that many of the so-called 11experienced 11 subjects had been running for any significant 
number of years. One interesting discovery that they did make, was that first-time 
runners initially associate, before later turning to dissociation as a coping mechanism. 
This phenomenon can probably be explained by the intense hardship associated with 
anyone's first training run. 
19 
If runners' use of association does increase correlationally with experience, what 
' 
factors might explain this relationship? Pennebaker & Ughtner's (1980) study suggests 
that the direction of attention, i.e. internal or external (corresponding to association and 
dissociation respectively), may be mediated by the novelty of the situation. Thus we 
might expect lesser experienced runners to concentrate more on their surroundings 
than their more experienced counterparts who have 11Seen it all before.11 An alternative 
explanation is that through experience, runners gradually learn the benefits of 
associating. Quite simply, experienced runners have also had significantly more time 
in which to practise the technique. As Schomer has said; 11all runners need to go 
through an exacting learning process and through successive approximations to 
achieve the capacity to effectively associate for prolonged periods of time ... (after all), 
the cognitive side of the runner is as accessible to training as the physiological siden 
(1987, pp 59 & 61). 
iii. Task-related focus: Clingman & Hilliard (1990) proposed that it is not the internal 
focus of association per se which is helpful, but rather the particular focus chosen from 
a number of possibilities. Their study of race walkers supported this by showing that 
a focus on cadence (number of steps per designated time period) led to better 
performance than did a focus on stride length (the distance covered in a single step). 
While both are associative techniques, for some reason, one was more appropriate 
and beneficial than the other. The findings of Johnston & McCabe (1993) support this 
notion that different associative techniques may be more beneficial to particular 
tasks/events. 
iv. Self-efficacy: Bandura's (1977) theory of self-efficacy sees behavioural changes 
as being mediated by the strength of the conviction that the particular behaviour can 
be successfully executed. Weinberg {1985) examined the relationship between 
self-efficacy and cognitive strategy use in a controlled laboratory setting. He found that 
subjects in the high self-efficacy condition performed better, regardless of which 
cognitive strategy they had been assigned to use. These findings are supported by 
those of Okwumabua (1985). Her results showed no relationship between 
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association/dissociation and performance, but indicated a strong positive relation 
' 
between self-efficacy and performance. 
This is perhaps not surprising in the light ·at Bandura's claims that past performance 
accomplishments are one of the primary sources of efficacy expectations. Presumably 
those runners performing well at any particular time also have a history of success. 
The research on self-efficacy has important implications for the teaching an~ use of 
cognitive strategies in endurance sport. It seems likely that the two could be used in 
a complementary nature to maximize beneficial effects. It is also possible that 
self-efficacy may be a mediator of which particular cognitive strategy would be the 
most beneficial under particular circumstances. Finally, as Weinberg (1985) points out, 
self-efficacy theory may hold important implications for the teaching of cognitive 
strategies. Telling people that the strategy was known to improve performance, may 
bolster their perception of its value and hence indirectly enhance the effectiveness of 
its implementation and use. 
v. Effort sense: Morgan & Pollock (1977) related effort sense to the 
association/dissociation distinction. They proposed that association represented a 
11SWitching on .. of the athlete's .. perception of effort .. function, while dissociation signified 
a .. switching off' of the same function. This notion is supported by Schomer's {1990) 
findings of a convergence of associative thought processes and percieved training 
intensity, in 8 out of 10 runners. This relationship between association and effort sense 
effectively explains why the former can lead to increased aerobic capacity. Association, 
by enhancing the awareness of sensory information, allows training at a higher 
intensity without the concommitant increasing risk of injury. Association also controls 
the flow of running energy potential, thus ensuring its expenditure at a rate matching 
environmental demand (Schomer, 1990). 
vi. Pain perception: Perhaps somewh~t related to effort sense is the issue of pain 
perception. It could be assumed that effort and performance in endurance events is 
limited by pain tolerance. Using eye pigmentation as an indicator of ability to tolerate 
pain, research has found a tendency in elite runners towards lighter shades, 
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suppos~dly an indicator of greater pain tolerance (Nideffer, 1981 ). While it seems clear 
that some people do have naturally higher pain thresholds than others, studies have 
shown that pain perception can also be augmented/reduced by various psychological 
factors (ibid.). 
Sacks et al. (1981) have claimed that pain during endurance events is considered 
more a sign or signal than something distressing in and of itself. This certainly seems 
the case with more experienced or elite runners, whose associative strategies allow 
constant monitoring and adaptation of their bodily responses, ultimately allowing them 
to avoid hitting the 'wall 11 (Morgan, 1978). Nideffer (1979) has proposed that by dealing 
objectively and rationally with the painful stimuli, these athletes are in effect dissociating 
from the pain on an emotional level. 
Lesser experienced runners on the other hand negotiate temporary pain zones by 
dissociating from the experience on all levels (Morgan, 1978). Their rationale for this 
is that directing attention away from the pain, will lessen its perception. This notion is 
supported by findings that attention to pain does in fact increase the magnitude of its 
perception (Pennebaker & Lightner, 1980). 
A final note of interest concerns the controlled study of Spink (1988). He found the 
effects of dissociative cognitive strategies to be enhanced by its coupling with 
analgesic suggestions. Thus subjects were told that the particular cognitive technique 
was known to reduce pain perception. While this has important implications for the 
teaching of cognitive techniques, it may well be related to what was said before about 
the role of self-efficacy in determining the success of cognitive strategy use. 
vii. Life stress: Felsten and Wilcox (1992) have asked why life stress is always 
ignored in studies of 11Stress11 and athletic performance. While they acknowledge the 
immediate influence of sport-specific anxiety on performance, they feel that the 
influence of stress from other domains also warrants more attention. Allthough such 
factors are more likely to play a role in sports requiring fine motor activity, they may 
also play a role in endurance sports. This may be the case in so far as life stress has 
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a bearing on possible moderators of successful cognitive strategy use such as those 
' 
mentioned above, e.g. self-efficacy. 
1.5 APPLIED USE OF COGNITIVE STRATEGIES IN ENDURANCE 
SPORT 
Pennebaker & Ughtner (1980) have noted that the amount of information that can be 
processed at any one time is limited. They concluded from this that the use of either 
association or dissociation necessarily restricts the use of the other. Schomer (1987) 
however, used a serial modal model of thinking, consistent with both Klatzky's and 
Gilhooly's broader frameworks for the whole information processing system (in 
Schomer, 1987), to show that the two processes are not necessarily mutually exclusive. 
This is supported by research findings indicating that people do switch from one 
strategy to another while running (Okwu.mabua, 1985; Sime in Sacks et at., 1981; 
Sachs, 1980). 
Orlick (1980) has noted that the phenomenon of concentration cycles requires flexibility 
of cognitive strategy use. Silva & Appelbaum (1989) in fact found an 11adaptive flexible .. 
approach to cognitive strategy use to be related to finishing position in Olympic 
marathon trialists. This suggests that being adaptively flexible with respect to strategy 
use, requires a skill which needs to be developed. This is in keeping with Morgan's 
assertion that effective switching between associative and dissociative strategies 
requires a .. finely tuned perceptostat that takes years of training to develop .. {1978, 
p49). 
While it seems that some athletes naturally develop and master such techniques over 
time, it is desirable from a sport psychological perspective that the development and 
implementation thereof may be aided to ensure optimal performance. While a number 
of authors have 11taughe cognitive strategies to athletes in an applied setting, 
Schomer's method of shaping thought processes seems the most promising, and 
although he used sophisticated equipment for the purpose, he also offered 
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suggestions as to how runners can learn to direct their thinking on their own or with 
' . 
the help of a running colleague (Schomer, 1990). 
1.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has sketched a historical account of the research leading to Morgan & 
Pollock's original formulation of the association/dissociation distinction in endurance 
sport. Additionally it has reviewed more recent studies, with the goal of assessing our 
current state of knowledge in the field. 
In summary, the current state of our knowledge suggests that first-time runners tend 
to associate to the pain they experience. If they continue running, most will over time 
develop "dissociative" techniques to deal with these unpleasant symptoms of fatigue. 
Many however drop out of their exercise programmes before ever reaching this stage. 
Teaching them dissociative techniques early on may hence increase their chances of 
compliance. More experienced runners (including the elite) however tend to use a 
greater percentage of associative techniques. This applies especially in races or in 
"tougher" training runs. In these cases associative techniques serve to minimize risk 
of injury, while maximizing economy of movement. While many experienced runners 
seem to use association spontaneously, their thought processes can be shaped in 
such a way as to optimize effectiveness of the techniques. 
A number of variables appear to mediate the effectiveness of cognitive strategies. 
These include intrapersonal factors such as motivation for running, performance 
expectations, self-efficacy and life stress, and situational factors such as the type of 
endurance event, the distance and training or racing nature of the event. This raises 
many issues to which future research should be directed, of which the method of 
teaching cognitive strategies is probably one of the most important. Teaching should 
be aimed not only at efficient learning of the techniques, but also at the efficient 
implementation thereof. Due to the myriad of moderating variables, the latter 
necessarily implies an adaptively flexible approach to cognitive strategy use. 
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As the vast majority of studies have been done on distance running, it is imperative 
that researchers now turn their attentions to cognitive processes in other endurance 
sports. As there are so many variables affecting the appropriateness of particular 
strategies under particular conditions, we need to make sure that the knowledge we 
seek ultimately, is practically useful. To this end it is vital that future research is 
undertaken in applied settings to provide the most practically relevant information. In 
doing so, the benefits of cognitive strategy use must be kept in perspective, as they 
can never make up for a lack of physical capacity or skill. Undoubtedly however, 
cognitions do affect performance, and in so far as they may be shaped, have the 




The previous chapter reviewed the literature on cognitive strategies in endurance sport. 
It concluded with a summary of the current state of knowledge in this field. The 
summary emphasized the necessity for more research in applied settings, and 
especially in sports other than running. A goal of this research was therefore to create 
a cycling-specific cognitive strategy classification system using Schomer's (1987) 
11applied• technique of thought recordings as a basis for the study. 
Another goal was to look at the relationship between competitive status (i.e. elite, 
average or recreational) and cognitive strategy use, to see whether there was any 
support for Morgan & Pollock's {1977) assertion that elite and non-elite athletes prefer 
to use association and dissociation respectively. In accordance with Schomer's {1987) 
findings it was expected that no relation would be found between the use of 
association and competitive status, but rather that there would be a relation between 
association and percieved effort. 
2.1 AIMS OF THE RESEARCH 
The primary and secondary aims of the research, were hence respectively : 
a) To develop a cycling-specific cognitive strategy classification system. 
b) To investigate the relationships between associative strategy use, competitive 
status and effort, in elite, average and recreational cyclists. More specifically: 
i. The effects of competitive status on association. 
ii. The effects of effort on association. 
iii. The interactive effects of status/effort on association. 
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2.2 SUBJECTS 
Subjects were chosen to fit into three distinct categories of competitive status; elite, 
average and recreational. They were contacted through advertisements placed at local . 
cycling clubs, and in a local cycling publication. Only male subjects were used, as no 
female cyclists initially responded to the advertisements. All subjects had completed 
the Argus Cycle Tour on at least one occasion, and were classified as elite, average 
and recreational according to their fastest times recorded on the Tour. 
Cyclists defined as elite all had a best time of at least under 2hr 45min, and best 
position ranging from 1st to 190th (mean time = 2hr 33min; mean position = 69,25). 
This translates into approximately the top 0,41% of riders completing the Tour each 
year. They ranged in age from 20- 50 years, with a mean of 25 years. (The 50 year 
old had ridden 2hr 38min in the Argus Tour only three years previously, and ridden 2hr 
41min in the most recent one). 
The best times of the average cyclists ranged from 2hr 47min to 3hr 07min (mean = 
2hr 59min). They ranged in age from 19 to 46 years (mean = 27,75 years). 
The fastest times by the recreational cyclists ranged from 3hr 51 min to 5hr 45min 
(mean = 4hr 23min), with the exception of one subject who had completed all 17 
Argus Tours, including a time of 2hr 50min eight years previously, but who now 
considered himself very much .. recreational ... (His most recent time was 4hr OOmin). 
Their ages ranged from 16- 57 years (mean = 30,25 years). 
2.3 APPARATUS 
Thought verbalizations were recorded using an Olympus Pearlcorder 8914 micro-
cassette recorder, which was worn in a specially designed padded pouch/belt around 
the waist. A Pearlcorder ME4 electret condenser microphone was pinned to the 
cyclists' shirts, just inside the shoulder, with the cord running down and under either 
arm to the recorder. MC-60 cassettes were used with a tape speed of 1 ,2cm/s to allow 
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one ho~r of recording on each side. The tapes were transcribed using an Olympus 
Microcassette Transcriber model T600 an.d an Olympus Head Set model E87. 
Heart rate was recorded using a Polar Vantage XL heart rate monitor by Polar Electro 
OY. It was pre-set to record heart rate every 60 seconds for the duration of the rides. 
The Borg scale (Borg, 1978) was printed on a card and shown to cyclists at the end 
of each trial. This enabled them to rate their perceived exertion (RPE) for the ride. (See 
Appendix 4). 
2.4 PROCEDURE 
Each subject underwent between two and four experimental trials, during which data 
was recorded using the aforementioned apparatus. The trials were normal training 
rides of not more than one hour (due to restrictions of tape length), over any course 
of the subjects' choice. The data from the last two trials of each subject was analysed. 
(From here on the term "experimental trials" refers solely to these two rides). The trials 
prior to these two were to allow the cyclists to feel comfortable using the equipment. 
If at the end of a ride subjects deemed the recordings as fairly representative of their 
thoughts, that data was analysed. If not, another trial was undertaken to allow the 
subjects to get used to using the equipment, thus eliminating as much as possible of 
the distraction initially created by the equipment and verbalizing process. 
At the start of each ride the following was said to the cyclist: "I'm interested in what 
people think about while cycling. So I'd like you to say aloud whatever comes into 
your mind during this cycle. All the material will be treated totally confidentially, so just 
speak your mind, be it an idea, feeling or general thought. Are there any questions 
before you start?" 
At the end of the ride RPE was recorded, and heart rate was manually down-loaded. 
The recordings were then transcribed. A stop-watch was used to keep track of how 
much time had elapsed at each stage of the transcriptions. It was started every time 
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the tap~ played, and stopped every time it was paused. Temporal quarters of each 
ride were calculated from the total time elapsed on the heart rate monitor's stop-watch 
function, and clearly marked on the transcriptions to enable percentages of associative 
thoughts to be calculated per quarter, and ultimately correlated with average heart 
rates for the same quarters. 
Thoughts were classified into ten subcategories, using Schomer's {1987) cognitive 
strategy classification system. (For a complete description of each subcategory, see 
Appendix 1). Whenever verbalizations were unintelligible, they were classified as 
.. indeterminate.. (x). A single thought unit was identified according to Schomer's 
definition thereof as 11the most concise intelligible cognitive expression (sentence or 
phrase) that could be understood when isolated'• (p 47). Where a particular unit clearly 
did not fit into any of the established categories, this was assumed to be cycling-
specific and classified as a new category. The total number of thoughts per 
subcategory were added and recorded. From this the number of associative thoughts 
were then tallied and expressed as percentages for the entire ride, as well as per 
quarter. 
Percentages of associative thoughts were compared across the three groups of 
cyclists to investigate the relationship between associative strategy use and competitive 
status (i.e. elite, average or recreational). Percentages of association were also 
correlated with RPE to see whether there was a relationship between associative 
strategy use and effort. 
There was some concern however that a single rating of perceived exertion for the 
entire ride may not be accurate enough in the case of cycling. As a result of being able 
to free-wheel (especially downhill), there might well be a greater range of effort within 
any one ride, than there would be in a marathoner's training run. Palmer et al. (in 
press) did in fact find bunch cycle racing to be stochastic in nature, but attributed the 
uneven heart rate responses rather to the tactical nature of bunch riding, rather than 
to terrain. It was felt however that even in the case of a solitary cyclist, there might be 
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too great a range of effort within any one ride, for a single APE value to be an accurate 
measure of effort. 
Hence it was felt that for cyclists, heart rate would be a more appropriate measure of 
effort as it would allow numerous measures to be taken at different stages within the 
ride. Heart rate was thus recorded every 60 seconds, from which a mean heart rate 
for each temporal quarter of the ride was calculated. Percentages of associative 
thought per quarter were then compared to average heart rates per quarter, in an 
attempt to get a more precise indication of the relationship betWeen association and 




This chapter presents the results of the study. The research methodology and the 
ensuing data analyses were designed in accordance with the aims of the study: 
a) To develop a cycling-specific cognitive strategy classification system. This was 
done by using Schomer's (1987) classification system as a basis, and by 
identifying new subcategories for those cycling-specific thoughts which by 
exclusion, did not fit any of Schomer's subcategories. 
b) To investigate the relationships between associative strategy use, competitive 
status and effort, in elite, average and recreational cyclists. More specifically, the 
relationships investigated were: 
i. Associative strategy use and competitive status. (One-way analysis of 
variance). 
ii. Associative strategy use and perceived exertion (RPE). (Correlation). 
iii. Interactive effects of heart rate and competitive status on associative 
strategy use. (Factorial analysis of variance). 
3.1 A CYCLING-SPECIFIC COGNITIVE STRATEGY 
CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM 
Schomer's (1987) ten subcategories of thought (Appendix 1) within the association/ 
dissociation framework, were the result of his amalgamation of thought themes with 
Nideffer's (1981) attentional style categorization. Figure 1 is a reproduction of 
Schomer's (1987) complete cognitive strategy classification system. The disc form 
clearly shows how his ten subcategories are placed within Nideffer's attentional style 
axes. The associative strategies are delineated from the dissociative ones by a thicker 
black line. 
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The tran,scribed thought recordings of this research wen~ . classified into Schomer's ten 
subcategories of thought. {See Appendix 3 for an example of a portion of analyzed 
text). Some thoughts, which were clearly specific to cycling as oppo~ed to running, 
however did not fit into any of the established subcategories. All of these cycling-
specific thoughts had to do with cycling equipment, e.g. "new part seems to be 
holding out OK"; "front tyre's looking a bit flat". These thought units were classified as 
associative, as they were all geared
1 
towards the maintenance of the task-related 
activity, i.e. cycling. In terms of attentional style, they were classified as narrow/external. 
Hence a new cycling-specific, associative, narrow/external subcategory of thought 
called "equipment monitoring" {Q) was identified. Where it fits into Schomer's 





A Feelings and affects 
B Body monitoring 
C Command and instruction 
P Pace monitoring 
E Environmental feedback 
R Reflective activity thoughts 
S Personal problem solving 
W Work, career and management 
I Course information 
T Talk and conversational chatter 
Associative mental strategy: A, B, C, P 
Dissociative mental strategy: E, R, S, W, I, T 
w 
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A Feelings and affects 
B Body monitoring 
C Command and instruction 
a Equipment monitoring 
P Pace monitoring 
E Environmental feedback 
R Reflective activity thoughts 
S Personal problem solving 
W Work, career and management 
I Course information 
T Talk and conversational chatter 
Associative mental strategy: A, B, C, a, P 




Figure 2: Revised, cycling-specific cognitive strategy classification system 
3.2 FJELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ASSOCIATION, COMPETITIVE 
STATUS AND EFFORT 
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To test whether elite cyclists display a preference for associative strategy use, a one-
way analysis of variance was executed on the total percentages of associative 
thoughts. For each subject, the mean percentage association of the two rides was 
used. (See Table 1 for summary of means and standard deviations). Analysis yielded 
an insignificant statistical difference between the three groups of cyclists [F(2,23) =0,01, 
p=0,988]. Elite athletes hence did not show a preference for associative strategy use. 
I II n I Mean I StDev I 
Elite 8 46,27 18,52 
Average 8 45,81 17,37 
Recreational 8 45,06 10,26 
Table 1: Means and standard deviations of percentage association, for elite, average 
and recreational cyclists 
To test whether, within each subject, the level of effort measured by APE could have 
determined associative strategy use, differences in percentages of association, and 
differences in APE values across the two experimental trials, were calculated for each 
subject. (See Appendix 5 for raw % association and APE data). The calculated 
differences of percentage association and APE were then correlated for all subjects. 
This yielded a slight positive, yet insignificant correlation, r = 0,291 (p = 0,345). 
Factorial analysis of variance was used to analyse the interactive effects of competitive 
status and effort, on associative strategy use. Average heart rate per quarter of each 
experimental trial was used as an indicator of effort, rather than APE. Due to logistical 
problems, heart rate was however not recorded for all the experimental trials. Hence 
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some subjects had 8 recorded heart rate measurements (from two experimental trials), 
some had 4 (from one experimental trial), and others had none. The latter were not 
included in this analysis. Across the three groups of subjects, a total of 24 training 
rides were completed using a heart rate monitor (7 by four elite cyclists, 1 0 by seven 
average cyclists, and 7 by five recreational cyclists) . See Appendix 6 for heart rate 
measures. 
Since there were unequal numbers in each group, and either four or eight measures 
of heart rate per subject, a least-squares approach to the analysis of variance was 
required. A design matrix of dummy variables was set up to identify subjects and 
represent group membership (Howell, 1987). The complete design matrix has been 
reproduced in Appendix 7. 
Regression analysis, using Method 1 (Howell, 1987) was performed to identify the 
variance components for each factor. This method adjusts the effect of each factor for 
all other effects, and tests only the unique variance attributable to each. Thus for heart 
rate (HR), status (S) and heart rate/status interaction (HR*S), where SSY represents 









HR,HR*S). See Table 
2.). 
None of status, heart rate, or the status/heart rate interaction showed any significant 
effects. Differences between subjects accounted for a large portion of the variance. Of 
the three factors being investigated, heart rate was however closest to being 


















(s - 1) 2 2 ) SSy(R HR,S,HR*S - R HR,HR*S 










N- s*hr SSy(1 - R
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HR,S,HR*S) 
N -1 ssy 
Partitioning of the analysis of variance model 
df ss MS F 
2 241,2 120,6 0,36 
1 804,4 804,4 2,432 
2 136,8 68,4 0,207 
6 7781,0 1296,8 
90 29762,3 330,69 
Summary table of the factorial analysis of variance for effects of status, 
heart rate (HR), status/heart rate interaction, and subjects 
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CHAPTER 4: 
INTERPRETATION OF THE RESULTS 
The goals of this chapter are to interpret the results, draw conclusions, and discuss 
implications for future research. 
4.1 A CYCLING-SPECIFIC SUBCATEGORY OF THOUGHT 
Results suggested the existence of a new cycling-specific subcategory of thought, 
which was not previously identified in Schomer's (1987) study of marathoners. This 
subcategory called Equipment monitoring (Q), consists of thoughts relating to the 
equipment, which are necessary for the continuation of the task at hand, in this case, 
cycling. As such, it includes mainly the bicycle and its individual parts, eg gear and 
braking systems, wheels, etc. Focii in this subcategory are associative by nature as 
they are task-related, and may be classified as narrow and external according to 
Nideffer's (1981) attentional dimensions. In terms of Schomer's (1987) classification 
system, this then places .. equipment monitoring.. in the narrow/external quadrant, and 
between 11Command and instructiod1 and 11pace monitoring .. on the associative side of 
the classification disc (see Figure 2, Chapter 3). 
The only possible scenario in which this category may apply to runners is with respect 
to running shoes, where a problem with them might interfere with goals of the run. As 
one would not often expect this to be the case, it is not surprising that this 
subcategory was not identified in Schomer's study. Thoughts on .. equipment" are 
clearly more likely to appear amongst cyclists than amongst runners, as the former 
have much more equipment which needs to function adequately for completion of the 
activity. To be comprehensive then, future studies on the identification and shaping of 
cyclists' thoughts should use Schomer's (1987) cognitive strategy classification system, 
and include .. equipment" as the eleventh subcategory. 
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The idertification of a cycling-specific subcategory raises an important issue with 
respect to the use of Schomer's (1987) cognitive strategy classification system across 
different sports. It suggests that if the classification system is to be used in a new 
sport, either for research or for the applied shaping of cognitions, it is imperative that 
a pilot study be done to check for any new sport-specific subcategories. If this is not 
done, the resultant data may be either incomplete or incorrectly classified. It seems 
likely however that the eleven subcategories used in this study will prove to be 
exhaustive for most other endurance sports. One. would not expect sports like rowing 
or swimming to throw up new subcategories of thought, previously unaccounted for 
in studies of marathoners and cyclists. Finally, it should be noted that when in future, 
a pilot study is undertaken to identify all possible subcategories of thought in a new 
sport, it should ideally take place in the true setting, to ensure that all potential sources 
of stimulii have the opportunity of presenting themselves as attentional focii. 
4.2 EFFECTS OF STATUS AND. EFFORT ON ASSOCIATIVE 
STRATEGY USE 
An examination of the means of the three groups of cyclists suggests that there was 
a slight increase in percentage associative strategy use across recreational, average 
and elite cyclists respectively. This lends slight support to Morgan & Pollock's {1977) 
finding that elite runners prefer to associate while the non-elite prefer to dissociate. The 
differences across the three groups were however not significant. 
A contributing factor to the non-significant results may have been the definitions used 
for status. Subjects were classified according to their previous fastest time in the Argus 
Cycle Tour. While the criteria for the elite status was a time of below 2hr 45min, all the 
average cyclists had a time of around 3hr OOmin. A few of them were in fact very close 
to the 2hr 45min threshold which signified elite status. Hence there was not a very 
clear distinction between the two groups of cyclists, and this may have somewhat 
blurred the results. 
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If there really are differences in associative strategy use as a function of status, the 
results would also have been more likely to show these differences statistically, had 
there been more than just 8 subjects in each group. A larger sample size would have 
proportionately decreased the standard deviations, and hence made it easier to detect 
differences across the groups. 
The standard deviations of percentage association amongst the recreational riders, 
was substantially below those of the elite and average categories. This could be taken 
to mean that better (i.e. elite or average) riders are more flexible when it comes to 
cognitive strategy use, than recreational riders are. A review of the literature (see 
Chapter 1) suggests that different strategies are more effective under different 
circumstances. From this it may be assumed that flexibility of cognitive strategy use 
has an adaptive function in endurance sport. In the light of this assumption, it is 
perhaps not surprising that elite and average cyclists (whose classification criteria 
according to time were not very distinct), showed more flexibility of cognitive stategy 
use than their recreational counterparts. 
Ultimately we should be aiming towards educating athletes and coaches about 
cognitive strategy use. It is this goal of practical application at which all research such 
as this is aimed. The apparent necessity. of flexibility of cognitive strategy use has 
important implications for the teaching of cognitive strategies. It tells us that we cannot 
simply teach developing athletes particular strategies, but that we must also teach 
them when particular strategies are more desirable than others, in order to maximize 
the chances of achieving the ideal performance state under different conditions. The 
existing studies have all been done under different circumstances with different 
subjects. Perhaps it is now time for a meta-analysis of which cognitive strategies work 
best under what conditions. 
The insignificant correlation between effort as measured by RPE, and percentage 
association, is in marked contrast to Schomer's (1987) highly significant findings. It has 
I 
already been mentioned in Chapter 2, that RPE as well as heart rate were recorded 
for each ride, because it was suspected that a single rating of effort may not be as 
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applicable to cycling, as the latter may involve a greater range of effort than running. 
' 
The idea was that if a simple correlation between association and APE was 
insignificant, a more detailed analysis of association by average heart rate per quarter 
might provide more significant results. This however did not prove to be the case. 
Factorial analysis of variance showed that heart rate as a measure of effort, yielded no 
more significant relationship with association than did perceived exertion (RPE). 
Comparatively, it was however closer to being statistically significant than status was. 
It is possible that the chosen methodology still did not do the association/effort 
relationship justice. Most of the subjects' rides were an hour long. If one considers that 
the calculated average heart rate per quarter was hence usually representative of 
approximately a 15 minute period, it is quite possible that any cyclist climbed and 
descended one or more hills during this time. The mean heart rate over these 15 
minutes would not however show the extreme (highest and lowest) recordings of heart 
rate, as they would cancel each other out. Hence preciseness of the association/effort 
relationship measure would be lost. 
While measures of heart rate per quarter may be more accurate than one global rating 
(e.g. APE) for the entire ride, they may still not be accurate enough. To study the 
association/effort relationship in cyclists more precisely, it may be necessary then to 
get even more regular measures of effort. Ideally one would overlay thought 
verbalizations with heart rate as measured at the exact moment of verbalization. 
Practically this would mean recording heart rate every few seconds, and overlaying 
these exactly on the thought verbalizations, so that one got an accurate picture of what 
was said when, and in conjunction with what amount of effort. 
Alternatively, future research on the determination of variation in cognitive strategy use 
might provide more conclusive evidence of a strong association/effort relationship if 
undertaken in a more controlled laboratory setting. Some preliminary data which has 
already been gathered using a cycle-ergometer seems to support this notion. It 
appears from this preliminary data that cognitions recorded during interval training on 
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the ergometer, with clearly delineated hard/easy stages, do show a more definite 
' 
relationship between associative strategy use and effort. 
There are a number of possible explanations for this. A laboratory setting would 
provide a purer picture of the relationship between any two variables, e.g. effort and 
association, as there would be fewer distracting stimulii demanding a shift of attentional 
focus away from what is being investigated. Traffic is for instance a very real problem 
in this respect. In the laboratory one would also be able to control variables to a far 
greater extent. Effort could for instance be varied in set amounts and over pre-
determined time-spans. Additionally there would . be no wind, and so the method of 
data collection used in this study would be more reliable, as there would be no 
category 11X11 (unintelligible). 
Finally, a laboratory setting would facilitate the improvement of data collection by 
allowing additional, and perhaps more comprehensive methods of data collection. 
M.Biackburn (Personal communication, 8 March 1993) did a study in which he tested 
a number of techniques to record the thoughts of runners while running on a treadmill. 
Results indicated that better thought recording was achieved when the thought 
verbalization technique (of Schomer, 1987) was used in conjunction with video-taping 
of the subject as he ran. After the runs, subjects watched the video tapes and were 
asked to clarify and expand on any verbalized thoughts. The present author suggests 
that Blackburn's laboratory techniques were valid, as Schomer had previously already 
identified the subcategories of thought occuring during a run in the true setting. 
Since the present research has now identified new cycling-specific subcategories in 
a 11true 11 cycling setting, it is now desirable that future attempts to document particular 
relationships such as the association/effort one, should be undertaken in a more 
controlled laboratory setting. 
Besides the applied setting, there are two other possible reasons why this study did 
not find a significant relationship between associative strategy use and effort. Firstly, 
while transcribing the thought verbalizations, it seemed for most subjects that the more 
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tired they were, the less they verbalized their thoughts. Intuitively this is not surprising. 
The implications however are that in stages of the ride where cyclists were tired and 
might consequently have been associating more, they in fact verbalized less thoughts. 
Hence the percentage association would in fact have been artificially lower over that 
particular quarter as well as over the entire ride. Secondly, all subjects chose their own 
routes. As a result, the two experimental trials were for some subjects very similar with 
respect to effort, and hence were not ideal for examining the effects which different 
levels of effort have on associative strategy use. 
The factorial analysis of variance confirmed the insignificant effects which status and 
effort individually have, on associative strategy use. It also showed no significant 
interaction effect of status and heart rate. Realistically there are probably lots of 
variables whose interactive effects determine percentage of associative strategy use. 
The high between-subjects variance apparent in this study, is testimony to this. For 
instance, the particular goal wanting to be achieved on any single ride could also have 
been an important determining factor. A serious cyclist whose goal is simply to have 
an easy recovery ride, would need to hold himself back. While the ride itself would in 
accordance with the goal be at low-effort, association would still be required to ensure 
that he was not exerting himself too much. 
4.3 LOGISTICAL LIMITATIONS TO THE METHODOLOGY 
While some methodological problems associated with this study represented a trade-
off for doing it in an applied setting, there were others which were purely the result of 
logistical limitations. 
i. The fact that cyclists were asked to restrict rides to one hour is a confounding 
variable, as in reality many of the subjects' training rides are of longer duration. 
Additionally, it sometimes happene~ that subjects actually did ride for slightly over an 
hour, and the recorded thought verbalizations, which cut off after the 60 minutes worth 
of tape ran out, were hence not representative of the entire ride. 
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ii. The process whereby thought transcriptions were divided into quarters could 
not always be exact. Firstly, heart rate was recorded every 60 seconds, so where a 
quarter of a ride spanned a certain number of minutes and some seconds, there was 
some overlap of heart rate across it, and the following quarter. Secondly, whenever the 
tape recorder was stopped during the transcribing process, the stop-watch should 
theoretically have been stopped at the very same moment. Practically however, some 
error would have crept in here. Thirdly, the transcribing equipment allowed for different 
playback speeds, but had no set point for actual speed. Actual speed hence had to 
be estimated to ensure that the quarters were marked in the proper places. While the 
effects of these logistical limitations were probably very small, they were however a 
source of some error. 
iii. Transcriptions were classified into the cognitive subcategories by the 
experimenter, and classifications were hence potentially subject to bias. If two 
independant raters could have been employed to do this job in a double-blind fashion, 
it would have minimized this risk. 
iv. While subjects may have perceived their effort to be just as high right at the 
beginning of any ride as at any other stage, this may not have been reflected in the 
heart rate measures. At the start of any ride, a cyclist's heart rate is presumably 
relatively close to resting pulse. It may take a few minutes before it rises enough to 
adequately reflect perceived effort. Hence the heart rate measures for the first quarters 
were probably slightly too low, which would have affected the analysis of the 
association/heart rate relationship. 
v. As heart rate was only recorded on 24 of the 48 experimental trials (50%), the 
factorial analysis was completed on the data of only four elite, seven average, and five 
recreational cyclists. While such limited data would have decreased the chances of 
finding significant results, it should however be remembered that each of these 
subjects was represented by either 4 or 8 measures of heart rate. 
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vi. lc;feally, subjects would be totally unaware of the equipment used to record 
verbalized thoughts. Realistically however, there were times when their thoughts did 
focus on the equipment. In spite of this confounding variable however, Schomer's 
(1987) method of thought recording is probably still the best method we have for use 
in a true setting. 
Finally, this research identified a new cycling-specific subcategory of thought. One may 
assume that this research has hence revised Schomer's (1987) original categories for 
specific use with cyclists, and that the revised categories are exhaustive for all possible 
thoughts in a cycling setting. However, the experimental trials in this study consisted 
of training rides, which in all cases except one, were completed by the subjects on 
their own. In competitive racing however, cyclists do not ride alone. Especially amongst 
the elite, a lot of time is spent in a bunch, as the drafting effect serves to lower energy 
expenditure (Palmer et al., in press). The. tactics involved in bunch riding and all its 
tactical components, eg. 11breaking away11 etc, call for what may potentially be another 
new subcategory of thought, possibly called ''tactical awareness11 • 
Thoughts in this subcategory would be associative by nature, as they are task-related. 
This would make ''tactical awareness11 the only associative subcategory of thought 
occuring in the broad/external quadrant of attentional focus. (See Figures 1 & 2, 
Chapter 3). We could hypothesize that if similar research was conducted in an 
interactive team sport such as soccer or rugby, this subcategory would feature 
strongly. Unfortunately cyclists involved in competitive racing (and the same would 
probably hold for sportsmen and women in interactive team sports), are quite 
understandably reluctant to carry recording equipment to verbalize their thoughts in 
such a setting. In training, these types of thoughts rarely appear, and hence they do 
not warrant a separate subcategory. However, to ensure adequate preparation for 
competition, it should be noted that some tactical strategizing is vital in training, even 
if it just takes the form of mental fantasy or visualization. 
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4.4 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
The aim of this final section is to place this research within the wider context of sport 
psychology as a growing discipline, summarize the main findings, and to discuss 
future directions the research should take. 
In the twentieth century sport success has become increasingly lucrative not only to 
athletes themselves, but also to a myriad of sponsors etc, who have a lot to gain from 
other people's performances. With so much vested interest, mainly commercial, (but 
not forgetting others like national fervour), it is perhaps not surprising that science is 
attempting to gain control over as many determinants of sporting performance as 
possible. Hence we have seen enormous growth in the sport sciences, one of the 
youngest of these being sport psychology. In an attempt to gain some control over 
(the often elusive) mental components of sport performance, sport psychology has 
amongst other things, started examining the make-up and functions of cognitions in 
sporting performance. It is within such a context that research of the nature of this 
study has been undertaken. 
This research has accomplished its primary aim of identifying a cycling-specific 
cognitive strategy classification system. Hence the first step in the study of the nature 
and possible shaping of cognitions during cycling, has been completed. As has 
already been suggested, it was imperative that this first step was undertaken in a true 
setting, to allow the identification of any regularly occurring cognitive focii. Partly as a 
result of the lack of control in this true setting however, the secondary aim of exploring 
the relationships betweer:t associative strategy use, competitive status and effort, was 
inconclusive. Because a cycling-specific cognitive strategy classification system was 
however devised, it now opens the door to future, more controlled studies in a 
laboratory setting. 
Let us not however forget that practical utility should be the ultimate goal of all sport 
psychological research. Once enough controlled studies have been done to explore 
the determination of cognitive variation in greater detail, techniques can then be 
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developed to apply this new-found knowledge. Research focus will hence shift once 
more to the real setting. The two main research questions should then become - are 
the newly developed techniques of practical utility in the true setting, and how do we 
best train athletes in their use? 
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APPENDIX 1: Schomer's cognitive strategy classification system, with a 
description of the 1 0 sub-categories of thought used as a 
frame-work in ~his research. (Taken directly from Schomer 
1987, pp 45-47). 
1. Feelings and affects (A). Thoughts concentrating on general sensations of the 
whole body, like feelings of vitality or fatigue, overall tiredness and stiffness 
without mention of specific body parts (for example: "I feel bushed", "still feeling 
fine", "I could embrace the world now, no aches and pains", etc.). 
2. Body monitoring (B). Thoughts of a here and now nature containing specific 
mention of anatomy, body parts, or body physiology like breathing rhythm, 
heart-beat, or painful calf muscles (for example: "That thigh does seem a bit 
tired'., "shoulders are stifF', "hands ~re cold", etc.). 
3. Command and instruction (C). Thoughts reflecting emphatic self-regulatory 
instructions to specific body parts. or instructions to whole body functioning 
distinctly related to the activity and maintenance of running (for example: "Relax 
your shoulders", "slow, slow, go easy", "breathe deeply now", etc.). 
4. Pace monitoring (P). Verbalized feedback on current performance with respect 
to time, distance, speed or any other available form or method of pacing {for 
example: "Running a bit fast for this section", "about a minute to go", "three 
kilometres to go", etc.). 
5. Environmental feedback (E). Thoughts of a here and now nature on the weather 
condition, temperature, light conditions, smell and noise level (for example: "Bit 
of cloud over there, not too hot", "once you're on this stretch it's so calm", 
"these car fumes -terrific, jicl", etc.). 
6. Reflective activity thoughts (R). Thoughts on past and future issues related to 
running, like past race experiences or training sessions, and future race 
preparation and planning (for example: "The times I have run this race I have 
always made it", "I will enter the Peninsula Marathon next year- give it a try", "I 
remember the way I struggled up this hill", etc.). 
7. Personal problem solving (S). Thoughts revolving around issues of an 
intrapersonal or interpersonal nature including reflective introspection, belief 
system evaluation and modification (for example: .. Shame, I wonder how my girl 
is .. , .. feeling very self-conscious about that revolting photograph in the paper .. , 
nyou know, as a kid I couldn't get myself to look into people's eyes11 , etc.). 
8. Work, career and management 0/V). Thoughts spent on job, work and career 
opportunities including thoughts centering around the execution, planning and 
construction of work (for example: 11Must get the kids to school on time 
tomorrow•, 11l'm supposed to cut the lawn - rats! 11 , 111 wonder if the patient I 
treated at work today is going to have another operation .. , etc.). 
9. Course information (I). Thoughts of a descriptive nature about scenery and 
general whereabouts that are of no consequence to pace (for example: 11Those 
mountains look absolutely great at sunset - absolutely beautiful11 , 11l'm going to 
run around this shopping complex .. , 11flowers all around me, what a scene11 , etc.). 
10. Talk and conversational chatter (T). Direct speech when in communication with 
other runners and thoughts expressing follow-up chatter to initial exchanges, as 
well as unintelligible or extraneous chit-chat (for example: 11Hi (name), good to 
see you out here again- ya, I'm well .. , 11how are your new Nikes? Comfortable? .. , 
11That was (name), hell of a fellow, you know•, etc.). 
APPENDIX 2: Revised, cycling-specific, cognitive strategy classification 
system 
1. Feelings and affects (A). Thoughts concentrating on general sensations of the 
whole body, like feelings of vitality or fatigue, overall tiredness and stiffness 
without mention of specific body parts (for example: nfeeling comfortable 11 , 11that 
doesn't feel good 11 , 11don't feel so strong today 11 , etc.). 
2. Body monitoring (B). Thoughts of a here and now nature containing specific 
mention of anatomy, body parts, or body physiology like breathing rhythm, 
heart-rate, or painful calf muscles (for example: 11heart rate 171 11 , 11legs a bit sore 
from yesterday 11 , 11Siight pain in my chest•., etc.). 
3. Command and instruction (C). Thoughts reflecting emphatic self-regulatory 
instructions to specific body parts or instructions to whole . body functioning 
distinctly related to the activity and maintenance of cycling (for example: 11push 
harder with the legs11 , 11relax shoulders a bit", 11don't stand up yet11 , etc.). 
4. Equipment monitoring (Q). Thoughts of a here and now nature containing 
specific mention of cycling equipment, like the brake or gear systems, wheels 
or pedals, necessary to the satisfactory continuation of cycling (for example: 
nnew part seems to be holding out <?K11 , .. front tyre's looking a bit flat", 11bike feels 
terrible today11 , etc.). 
5. Pace monitoring (P). Verbalized feedback on current performance with respect 
to time, distance, speed or any other available form or method of pacing (for 
example: 110ne minute to the top 11 , 11time 25:5011, 11twO more short hills, then 
downhill all the way11 , etc.). 
6. Environmental feedback (E). Thoughts of a here and now nature on the weather 
condition, temperature, light conditions, smell and noise level (for example: 11hell, 
it's hot today11 , 11Can smell someone's braai11 , 11much colder than yesterday 
• II t ) morn1ng , e c .. 
7. Reflective activity thoughts (R). Thoughts on past and future issues related to 
cycling, like past race experiences or training sessions, and future race 
preparation and planning (for example: 11tomorrow there's a R1 00 first prize - big 
deal11 , 11in a race I'd be doing 60 km/hr here11 , nnext week's training could be 
quite heavy11 , etc.). 
8. Personal problem solving (S). Thoughts revolving around issues of an 
intrapersonal or interpersonal nature including reflective introspection, belief 
system evaluation and modification (for example: .. got to ·get Tony out to South 
Africa11 , 11people will think I'm mad11 , 111 never used to get upset so easily .. , etc.). 
9. Work, career and management 0N). Thoughts spent on job, work and career 
opportunities including thoughts centering around the execution, planning and 
construction of work (for example: 11must find out about importing those 
glasses .. , 11 1'11 have to be more firm with (name) on Monday11 , .. absolutely must do 
some work tonight11 , etc.). 
1 0. Course information (I). Thoughts of a descriptive nature about scenery and 
general whereabouts that are of no consequence to pace (for example: 111itter 
all over the place here11 , ''this must be one of the most beautiful parts of Cape 
Town11 , 11hell of a colour they've painted that house11 , etc.). 
11. Talk and conversational chatter (T). Direct speech when in communication with 
other cyclists and thoughts expressing follow-up chatter to initial exchanges, as 
well as unintelligible or extraneous chit-chat (for example: 11morningl 11 , 11howzit-
you going up to the Nek?11 , 11isn't this too early for you?11 , etc.). 
APPENDIX 3: An example of a portion of analysed text (average subject). 
11Wind's picking up a bit. Wonder what it's like in False Bay 
1-------------- E: --------------1 1------------------- ~ ---------------------
today. Funny how it's easier with a cyclist ahead of you. It 
-------1 1-------------------------- ~ ------------------------------------1 1--
pulls you along. Guy's probably daydreaming like I do. Then they 
---- ~ -------------1 1----------------------- ~ -----------------------1 1----------~--
come up behind and give you a hell of a fright. This is a nasty 
------------------------ ~ -------------------------------------1 1------------------
little stretch, up to Chapmans. 'Morning!' That woke him up. Not 
---------- fl ---------------------------1 1--- T ----1 1-------- ~ -----------1 1---
many cyclists on the road, though there were quite a few this 
----------------------------------------- I ------------------------------------------
morning in Camps Bay. Ahl Legs are tired. Heart rate OK. One 
--------------------------------1 I-A-I 1------ 8 -------1 1------- fl ------1 1----
more kay to the top. ~oads are quite quiet. Two cars overtaking. 
-------------- fl ----------1 1-------------- I -----------1 1------------ I ----------1 
Takes the pleasure out of cycling. Got to sort out (name) at 
1------------------- ~ ---------------------1 1--------------- w --------------
work. Getting a bit worried about it. OK, push. Nearly there. 17 
------1 1-------------------- ~ --------------1 1-- c ----1 1------ fl -----1 1-
minutes. Not bad going. 11 
--- fl --I 1-------- fl -------1 
APPENDIX 4: Borg's (1978) rating scale for perceived exertion (APE) . 
6 
7 VERY VERY LIGHT 
8 
9 VERY LIGHT 
10 
11 FAIRLY HARD 
12 




17 VERY HARD 
18 
19 VERY VERY HARD 
20 
KINDLY RATE YOUR TRAINING INTENSITY (PERCIEVED 
EXERTION) ON THIS SCALE 
APPENDIX 5: Raw data- Percentage associative strategy use and RPE 






























































% Assoc Trial RPE Trial1 RPE Trial2 
2 
30,69 11 13 
79,26 10 18 
40,32 10 11 
75,24 9 13 
35,48 6 11 
60,94 13 16 
50,88 9 15 
31,58 10 11 
58,69 14 16 
66,03 11 17 
50,63 11 15 
39,78 11 13 
18,33 11 15 
38,37 9 13 
52,88 11 12 
57,05 11 15 
51,77 10 15 
37,06 13 14 
40,82 10 13 
55,98 9 13 
32,76 11 12 
50,67 9 13 
32,63 11 12 

























































Raw data - mean heart rate measures (HR) and % 
association (Ass) for the four quarters of each experimental 
trial (in which heart rate was recorded). 
1st quarter 2nd 3rd 4th 
quarter quarter quarter 
57,14 96,46 80,37 66,00 
177,44 160,89 142,11 125,13 
90,38 82,61 61,70 62,50 
164,54 178,92 174,23 167,00 
40,00 10,00 22,22 70,00 
130,07 120,33 115,40 139,67 
45,45 41,67 36,84 77,55 
155,64 167,50 158,20 166,20 
100,00 70,00 43,75 47,62 
158,92 181,42 166,00 152,08 
50,00 63,64 58,33 20,00 
123,20 159,50 155,00 143,29 
61 '11 30,43 5,88 50,00 
125,14 124,40 115,00 120,79 
50,50 48,86 64,20 77,14 
122,92 130,27 132,33 134,79 
77,97 66,00 68,85 75,47 
126,33 128,25 142,50 129,42 
68,42 76,00 80,00 77,78 
153,17 163,17 149,50 144,46 
43,90 63,72 13,24 37,93 
151,47 172,6 158,40 144,33 
12,50 9,09 37,50 0,00 
122,56 119,30 130,40 134,89 
5,26 21,95 26,32 47,37 
144,83 162,23 158,54 145,92 
50,00 62,96 50,00 3,03 
133,07 145,62 169,62 135,62 
71,43 9,09 57,14 14,29 
117,92 123,00 115,54 112,42 
Subject 1st quarter 2nd 3rd 4th 
quarter · quarter quarter 
A7 
Ass 36,67 35,90 40,00 40,74 
HR '147,38 162,88 161,25 157,00 
A7 
Ass 39,29 55,00 58,70 68,49 
HR 145,50 150,60 155,73 156,29 
R 1 
Ass 31,58 32,76 41,89 17,02 
HR 132,27 149,91 142,45 141 ,27 
R2 
Ass 54,55 47,22 66,67 57,50 
HR 160,40 167,4 152,8 154,11 
R3 
Ass 37,50 25,64 26,80 31,00 
HR 146,20 135,00 143,53 142,38 
R4 
Ass 52,33 51,28 42,57 54,26 
HR 134,50 153,40 144,80 123,22 
R4 
Ass 52,48 64,86 53,51 46,74 
HR 148,25 162,25 159,08 141,55 
R5 
Ass 33,33 51,02 47,92 43,14 
HR 176,62 172,77 168,62 138,62 
R5 
Ass 52,00 63,83 54,55 28,57 








Statistical design matrix. 
Row G S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 G1 G2 
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 






































































0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 
0 1 0 0 
0 1 0 0 
0 1 0 0 



































































































Row G S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 G1 G2 




0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
30 3 1 0 
31 3 1 0 
32 3 1 0 
33 3 1 0 
34 3 1 0 
35 3 1 0 
36 3 1 0 
37 3 0 1 
38 3 0 1 
39 3 0 1 
40 3 0 1 
41 3 0 0 
42 3 0 0 
43 3 0 0 
44 3 0 0 
45 3 0 0 
46 3 0 0 
47 3 0 0 
48 3 0 0 
49 3 0 0 
50 .3 0 0 
51 3 0 0 
52 3 0 0 
53 3 0 0 
54 3 0 0 
55 3 0 0 
56 3 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 0 
0 0 1 0 0 
0 0 1 0 0 
0 0 1 0 0 
0 0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 1 0 




















































































































62 3 0 0 0 
63 3 0 0 0 
64 3 0 0 0 
65 3 0 0 0 
66 3 0 0 0 
67 3 0 0 0 
68 3 0 0 0 
69 2 1 0 0 
70 2 1 0 0 
71 2 1 0 0 
72 2 1 0 0 
73 2 1 0 0 
74 2 1 0 0 
75 2 1 0 0 
76 2 1 0 0 
77 2 0 1 0 
78 2 0 1 0 
79 2 0 1 0 
80 2 0 1 0 
81 2 0 0 1 
82 2 0 0 1 
83 2 0 0 1 
84 2 0 0 1 
85 2 0 0 1 
86 2 0 0 1 
87 2 0 0 1 
S4 S5 S6 G1 
0 0 1 0 
·o o 1 o 
0 0 1 0 
0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 



























































































































Row G S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 G1 G2 G1*HR G2*HR 
88 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0,00 141,55 
89 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0,00 176,62 
90 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0,00 172,77 
91 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0,00 168,62 
92 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0,00 138,62 
93 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0,00 173,33 
94 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0,00 178,64 
95 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0,00 164,73 
96 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0,00 149,18 
